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RACE CONSCIOUSNESS: CAN THICK,
LEGAL CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS ASSIST
POOR, LOW-STATUS WORKERS

OVERCOME DISCRIMINATORY HURDLES
IN THE FAST FOOD INDUSTRY?
A REPLY TO REGINA AUSTIN
REGINALD LEAMON ROBINSON*
1
Racists are people who are afraid.

[Tihe general effect of the dominance-subjectionrelation is to destroy
both parties, each by the other, and each in a specific manner.
wholly
Though the corrosive suffering of the victim is
incommensurate with and overshadows the psychic deformation of
does not transform oneself into an
the victimizer, one nevertheless
2
executioner without great cost.
While whites need a better understanding of race and ethnicity,
blacks are most in need of racial healing. How can blacks become

*
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Professor of Law,

Howard Law School, Washington, D.C. B.A. (Phi Beta Kappa, Magna Cum
Laude), Howard Univ. (1981); M.A. (Political Science), Univ. of Chicago (1983);
Exchange Scholar (Political Science/Economics), Yale Univ. (1984-85); J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania (1989); Ph.D., Candidate (Political Science), Univ.
of Chicago (1993-Present). I would like to thank Professor Kevin Hopkins for
inviting me to participate in this program and for giving me an opportunity to
reply to Professor Regina Austin's work. I would like to thank Elizabeth
Lopez Robinson, Ph.D., for her invaluable insights and our dynamic
I finally would like to thank my research assistants, Ms.
discussions.
Stephanie Masker (class of 2001) and Ms. Noreen Muhib (class of 2002) for her
Of course, the politics and errata belong
dedication, skills, and effort.
exclusively to me.
1. ALBERT MEMMI, RACISM 97 (Steve Martinot trans., Univ. of Minn. Press
2000). See also Kenneth L. Taylor-Butler, Unfair Suspicion and Contempt
Create "Black Rage" Our Diversity Should be Respected, not Merely Tolerated,
KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 1, 1999, at B4, available at 1999 WL 2405849
(describing events in which fear led whites to rely on racist attitudes, thus
treating differences in blacks as inferior, by telling the story of his executive
wife who after showing her driver's license, employment badge, and a business
card was told by the manager that he would 'approve your check, but don't
come back without additional ID.").
2. MEMMI, supra note 1, at 57.
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racially healed? By allowing themselves to believe that all things in
life are not determined by race and letting go of race as a defining
concept ....

[Ilt will liberate blacks because it will force them to

respond to people as individuals and not as representativesof a race
.... [T/he problem with black attitudes about whites is that blacks
see whites as some 'giant omnipotent' race
3 of people againstwhom
blacks, like David in the Bible, must fight.
INTRODUCTION

Can we explain why poor, low-status workers like low wageearning blacks cannot successfully compete for fast-food jobs?
Why do managers, especially minority ones, reluctantly hire
minorities?
Why are immigrant minorities preferred over
domestic ones? If poor, low-status workers get these jobs, will
customers, regardless of their race or ethnicity, treat them with
respect? Are these customers white or black or Latino or Asian?
And if they get these jobs, can they ever advance to managerial
positions? When blacks patronize fast food restaurants like
McDonalds, will they get good or poor service? Who gives them
poor services? Are the workers white, black, Latino, Asian or
immigrants?
If white fast food owners refuse to hire poor, low-status
workers like low wage-earning blacks, what persuasively explains
this problem? If blacks or other minorities own these restaurants,
what explains the reluctance to hire blacks? If blacks or other
minorities have bad attitudes when they work for fast food
restaurants or if they as customers disrespect employees of fast
food restaurants, what explains this experience?
Given the
foregoing, what happens when injured parties sue, seeking tort
redress for their so-called impermissible racialized experiences?
Are these experiences a function of structural oppression (i.e.,
white
supremacy
or institutional
racism)
and racial
discrimination? Or are they a function of poor service and bad
managerial policies?
Professor Regina Austin, in Contextual Analysis, Race
Discrimination, and Fast Food,4 answers these questions by
relying on ethnographies. Ethnographies proffer thick contextual
footings by which we can perhaps better understand why judges
grant or deny redress to injured blacks who work for or who
patronize fast food restaurants. By so relying, Austin has tools
that allow her to analyze critically different structural factors at
play within the fast food industry. With these factors exposed to

3. JAMES L. ROBINSON, RACISM OR ATTITUDE? THE ONGOING STRUGGLE
FOR BLACK LIBERATION AND SELF ESTEEM 233 (1995).

4. Regina Austin, Contextual Analysis, Race Discrimination, and Fast
Food, 341 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 207 (2000).
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the light of critical reading, Austin reveals how white supremacy,
racial stereotypes, and racial discrimination work intimately with
the fast food industry's profit maximizing goals. As such, the fast
food industry generally works best when domestic blacks are
marginal workers. For Austin, courts render legal decisions
without appreciating the inextricable link between racism and
profit taking. By exposing this link, Austin uses ethnographies,
providing us with a different jurisprudential approach, one that
can revive the early call by the sociological jurispruds.'
In this reply essay, I will first discuss Professor Austin's
jurisprudential approach, one grounded in structural factors which
explain how and why blacks or poor, low-status minorities
experience the fast food industry. Second, I look at ethnographies
and the manner in which Professor Austin uses them. Part III
focuses on bad attitudes, employment discrimination, bad
customers, and poor service. In so doing, I argue that Austin's
approach, while critically and analytically important, has limits
especially if Austin intends us to view poor, low-status workers as
simply structural victims of white oppression and racial
discrimination. In addressing this point, I posit that we must
blend structural analysis with social psychological perspectives, in
which the individual plays a critical role in the manner in which
she experiences her interpersonal space. In taking this approach,
I reject the idea that blacks must always be viewed as victims.
Rather, I assert that poor, low-status workers like low wageearning blacks must be central players who co-create racialized
experiences with whites. As such, poor, low-status minorities and
others (e.g., whites) must work together to create racial
oppression.
As I have argued recently, I believe that race
consciousness must be a key factor in these racialized experiences. 6
If not, structural factor analysis robs poor, low-status minorities of
responsible agency. In the last section, I conclude.
I.

WRITING WITHIN

A PROGRESSIVE

JURISPRUDENTIAL TRADITION

How can we, as attorneys and race scholars, explain what
motivates people, regardless of race and color, to undertake acts
that directly discriminate or that implicitly recriminate, especially
acts that could bear ultimately on their life chances?7 None of us

5. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.L. REV.
57 (1897); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to
Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and
Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence,25 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1912).
6. See generally Reginald Leamon Robinson, "Expert" Knowledge:
Introductory Comments on Race Consciousness, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 145

(2000).
7. See, e.g., A. Dahleen Glanton, Shades of Prejudice in Black Society, CHI.
TRIBUNE, Aug. 20, 1989, at C1 (discussing a federal lawsuit in which plaintiff,
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knows the answer. Nevertheless, we must ask. In addressing
many aspects of this question, legal scholars have taken different
approaches, all contributing to the law's jurisprudential
development. The tools on which legal scholars have relied vary,
and with these variations, they have styled themselves as
critical theorists,1
positivists, 8 realists,9 literary critics,
4
feminists," philosophers," Race Crits, etc. For example, Race
Crits blend academic disciplines with legal analysis, viz.,
geography," psychology,' 6 religion, 7 and culture. 8 Regardless,
these legal scholars intellectually sojourn to find hardened
concepts within a judge's reasoning. Ultimately, these scholars
reveal an opinion's difficulties and provide willing judges with
substantive and analytical means by which they could broaden or
narrow a holding, expand or contract a legal standard." In the
Tracy Lynn Marrow, a light-skinned black typist, filed a claim against her
supervisor, a dark-skinned black woman, alleging that she suffered
discrimination and termination based on her skin color).
8. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON
JURISPRUDENCE (R. Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1888).
9. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence- The Next Step,
30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930).
10. See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973); Stanley

Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984).
11. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism
and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984).
12. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing
Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987); Robin West, Jurisprudenceand
Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
13. See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, From the Lighthouse: The Promise of
Redemption and the Possibility of Legal Interpretation, 11 CARDOZO L. REV.
1687 (1990).
14. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 1999); KIMBERL9 CRENSHAW ET AL.,
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT
(1995).
15. See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political
Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994).
16. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, Id, Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); David
Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899
(1993).
17. See, e.g., Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The
Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985
(1990).
18. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, CriticalRace Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire
Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 2129 (1992).
19. See Richard Delgado, Critical Race Theory, in SAGE RACE RELATIONS
ABSTRACTS no. 2 at 3 (Louis Kushnick ed., 1994). Delgado aptly states:
Critical thought first gained a foothold in philosophy, literature,
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end, by attempting to address her article's goals, Austin urges
legal scholars to reach beyond the constraining boundaries of
traditional legal analysis so that they can free the law from its
historical pinions. 0
By writing within a progressive jurisprudential tradition, race
scholars like Charles R. Lawrence provide an excellent example of
this "law and" approach that Austin undertakes. After the United
States Supreme Court decided Washington v. Davis," Lawrence
asked the Court to rethink its holding, in which the highest court
required plaintiffs who constitutionally challenged a facially
neutral law to prove that the actors or authors were motivated by
22
In this writing, Lawrence
a racially discriminatory purpose.
relied upon modern psychoanalytical theory to account for
unconscious motives by private and state actors. According to
Freud, the mind refuses discomforting guilt by ignoring ideas that
work against what it knows to be right.2 ' According to cognitive
theory, culture, by means of authority figures, teaches beliefs and
values. 24 Today we know racism injures others, and most of us
believe that we are not racists. Unfortunately, "[wie cannot be
individually blamed," as Lawrence argues, "for unconsciously
harboring attitudes that are inescapable in a culture permeated
with racism.
Thus, Lawrence's account proves especially
illuminating if these actors produce policies that, while facially
neutral, nevertheless discriminatorily impact racial minorities.
Yet, with an inescapable intent element, the Court placed a
governmental actor's unconscious racism beyond the equal

sociology and anthropology, where Criticalists challenged ideas such as
the universality of truth, the neutrality of law and the notion that every
text had a single or determinate meaning .... They also borrowed the

idea of indeterminacy, insisting that legal reasoning rarely, if ever, has
exactly "one right answer."

Instead, there will be multiple precedents

and competing interpretations of those precedents from which judges
may choose.
Id.
20. See DAVID BOHM, WHOLENESS AND THE IMPLICATE ORDER 1 (1988)
("Becoming dissatisfied with this state of affairs [i.e., fragmenting the whole
into separate parts], men have set up further interdisciplinary subjects, which
were intended to unite these specialties, but these new subjects have
ultimately served mainly to add further separate fragments.").
21. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
22. Id. at 245-51.
23. See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 322 ("Freudian theory states that the
human mind defends itself against the discomfort of guilt by denying or
refusing to recognize those ideas, wishes, and beliefs that conflict with what
the individual has learned is good or right.").
24. Id. at 323 ("[Tlhe theory of cognitive psychology states that the culture

- including, for example, the media and an individual's parents, peers, and
authority figures - transmits certain beliefs and preferences.").
25. Id. at 326.
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protection doctrine.26 Lawrence writes against this result by
attempting through psychoanalytic theory to deepen the Court's
contextual analysis so that, if the court were willing, it would
recognize that most whites would not act intentionally racist or
self-consciously discriminatory. Thus it could more effectively
advance the constitutional goals of the equal protection doctrine.27
By relying on a "law and" approach to legal scholarship,
Professor Lawrence writes within a progressive jurisprudential
tradition that ultimately deepens our reading of the legal text, an
arbitrary construction that preserves liberal legalisms like stare
decisis. Like Lawrence's radical, seminal critique of Davis,
Professor Regina Austin jurisprudentially and critically moves her
analytical insights beyond traditional legal analysis, and in so
doing, she too urges us to think differently through a "law and"
approach to her legal scholarship. In short, Professor Austin
invites us to consider "law and anthropology," a different
methodological tool that can reveal broader, more complex ways of
unearthing contextual understandings, that can effectively work to
better us as attorneys, and that can efficiently aid us in serving
our clients, the bar, and society.
In so doing Austin, like
Lawrence, writes powerfully within this tradition, inviting race
scholars to conjoin ethnographic studies and legal analysis.
As Lawrence effectively did in his critique of Davis and
Arlington Heights, 8 Professor Austin also does when she examines
the crucibles of Shirley v. Vicnat, 9 Alexis v. McDonalds
Restaurant,"° McCaleb v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.,"1 and Wells v.
Burger King Corporation.32 Each case involves discriminatory
practices within the fast food industry, and each case exposes a
particular aspect of this practice.
Regardless of the cases'
outcomes, Austin provides a richer, thicker, more complete context
out of which both facts and legal reasoning come. In examining
this context, Austin merges sociology and anthropology (i.e.,
ethnographies) with legal analysis. As in the case of those legal
scholars who preceded her and her contemporaries like Professor
Lawrence, Austin asserts that ethnographies guide us past the
wooden thicket that serves as traditional legal analysis to the
fount, the wellspring out of which structural oppression, like
institutional racism, flows. For Austin, these structural factors
26. Id. at 323 ("The equal protection clause requires the elimination of

governmental decisions that take race into account without good and
important reasons. Therefore, equal protection doctrine must find a way to
come to grips with unconscious racism.").
27. See Lawrence, supra note 16.

28. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
29. Austin, supra note 4, at 211-14.
30. 67 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 1995).
31. 28 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
32. 40 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (N.D. Fl. 1998).
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provide a better, thicker, complete context to explain not only
discriminatory practice but also its inescapable persistence. I call
her approach: thick, legal contextual analysis.
II.

CAN ETHNOGRAPHIES HELP?

At the outset, Professor Austin indicts courts that advance
law as science and as relatively autonomous. Not only is the law a
contested site for conflicting interests and politics, but it also
depends on facts, pleadings, and evidence to resolve disputes.
What is a fact? Is it legal or sociological? Do the pleadings arise
out of institutionally accepted legal frameworks?
What is
evidence? How does evidence inform, influence, and determine
what must be properly admitted as a legal fact?33 In effect, legal
technology (e.g., doctrine and its language) must depend on
exogenous variables (i.e., sociological data). Yet, if courts ignore
the interdependence of these internal and external forces, then
they also disregard the social context out of which the dispute
arose and in which it must be resolved. For Austin, noncontextual decisions remain "unintelligible even to persons trained
in the law."34 Equally important, by disregarding context, can
courts appreciate how their legal renderings will impact on
plaintiffs, especially if courts disregard race, ethnicity, class,
gender, or age? Austin answers in the negative. Without this
context, market-generated, socially sanctioned discrimination,
which represents only a patina, never gets appropriately and
legally redressed. More fundamentally, the social structure that
naturalizes
racial
prejudice
and
diminished
economic
opportunities remains socially invisible and legally uncontested.35
How do we expose deeply embedded, socially normalized
structures that expose poor, low-status minorities to racial
discrimination, or legally injurious prejudices, that rests beyond
the reach of traditional legal analysis? For Austin, we expose
structural stereotypes and institutional racism by destabilizing
the relative autonomy of the law.36 Second, we achieve this goal by
33. See, e.g., Alexis, 67 F.3d at 347 (1st Cir. 1995). Judge Bownes wrote
that:
Opinion testimony from lay witnesses is admissible only if it is
.rationally based on the perception of the witness and ... helpful to a

clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of
the fact in issue." Rulings on the admissibility of lay opinion testimony

are reviewed only for "manifest abuse of discretion." The exclusionary
ruling was well within the district court's broad discretion.
Id.
34. Austin, supra note 4, at 207.

35. Id.
36. Id. See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 21
(1989) (discussing language as a vehicle not for expressing reality or certainty

but for revealing not true objectivity but human truths).
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placing legal disputes back into their material and social history. 7
Not the first to issue this injunction, 38 Austin, in "The Black
Community", 9 urged blacks to engage in legal praxis to achieve at
least two goals. First, if blacks return "Home" to the black
community,0 they could effectively bridge the gap between the
"street and straight worlds."
Second, if blacks invested
themselves in the black community, we could develop a
jurisprudence that not only saves deserving lawbreakers, but also
destroys the fluid lines between legal and extra-legal economic
conduct.42 As in the past, Austin again invites us to move beyond
traditional legal analysis by engaging in potent contextual
analysis. One can effectively accept this invitation by relying, as
does Austin, on ethnographies.
In unearthing the hidden structures that make racial
tools.
likely,
ethnographies
become
vital
oppression
Ethnographers directly observe their subjects. They describe and
evaluate a group's activities. They gather data by living and
working within their quasi-scientific laboratories. Even though
they get closer to their subjects, ethnographers carefully record
their subjects' activities.
In addition, these cultural
anthropologists appreciate that human organizations stand on
seamless webs between the culture, the material, the behavior,
and the cosmology.43 As a result, they focus on local levels, where
"people struggle, compete, collaborate, and adapt to accomplish
their cultural goals."' By so focusing, ethnographers expose life
choices that critique universal concepts and status quo norms.
When properly deployed, ethnographies can explain how law
directly and literally works in a person's life, 5 especially if legal

37. Id. at 2.
38. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of
Race: Does the Fundamental ContradictionHave a Corollary?, 23 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 407 (1988); Martha Minow & Elizabeth Spelman, In Context, 63

S. CAL. L. REV. (1990).
39. Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics
of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769 (1992).

40. Id. at 1817.
Only blacks who are bound by shared economic, social, and political
constraints, and who pursue their freedom through affective
engagement with each other, live in real black communities. To be part
of a real black community requires that one go Home every once in a

while and interact with the folks.
Id.
41. Id. at 1814.
42. Id. at 1816. ("The jurisprudential component of a politics of
identification would make an issue of the fact that the boundary between legal
economic conduct and illegal economic conduct is contingent.").
43. Austin, supra note 4, at 209-11.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 6.
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doctrines function as one of the operative structures in the lives of
poor, low-status minorities who work in the fast food industry.
In this way, ethnographies hold promise for those like Austin
who wish sincerely to deconstruct and reconstitute the law so that
it truly liberates poor, low-status minorities. Without telling us
specifically how ethnographies will effect this new arrangement,
Austin asserts that race ethnographies provide fresh approaches
to those trapped in society's basement and to those struggling to
advance themselves out of it. Austin fails to address other
questions about ethnographies. For example, what we must ask
is: can ethnographers observe, whatever direct or indirect might
mean, their subjects without biasing the outcome? When one
describes, does she change whatever she observes?46 Likewise,
when one evaluates, does she impose values, judgments or
prejudices that affect what she observes? Furthermore, have not
anthropologists been for and against the causes of white
supremacy and Jim. Crow politics?47
Do scholars trained in
scientific methods of investigation, an approach deeply committed
to contextual analysis, have an irrational loyalty to white
supremacy and eugenics?48 Throughout her article, Austin ignores

46. See MICHAEL TALBOT, MYSTICISM AND THE NEW PHYSICS 3 (1983)
(Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle: "the observer alters the observed by the
mere act of observation.").
47. See, e.g., Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV.
1375 (1999) (discussing how the father of modern anthropology, Franz Boas, of
Columbia University, and his students were instrumental in challenging the
pseudo scientific data on which eugenicists rely to claim racial distinctions and
higher intelligence).
48. See generally ROBERT V. GUTHRIE, EVEN THE RAT RACE WAS WHITE: A
HISTORICAL VIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY (1976). Guthrie writes:
Psychology courses often became vehicles for eugenic propaganda ....
Harvard, Columbia, Brown, Cornell, Wisconsin, and Northwestern were
among the leading academic institutions teaching eugenics in
psychology courses. But psychology served the eugenicists' cause in a
far more important way than merely being an outlet for its propaganda.
Psychology made its chief contribution by providing much of the
philosophical discussion purporting to validate the existence of "finelined" individual differences.
While psychology's measuring devices
conveniently labeled these mental variations, its developmental theories
helped guide the eugenicists from theoretical positions to applied
programs.
Id. at 81.
In addition, the Research Committee of the Eugenics Section of the American
Breeders Association unanimously resolved to create a committee of scholars
to "study the best practical means of purging the blood [of Americans who had]
deteriorating influences of anti-social classes" because it feared that natural
selection alone would not achieve the "survival of the fittest". Id. at 85.
Psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, medical doctors, and attorneys
were enlisted.
Id.
Psychologists would devise standards and tests for
identifying mental defectives. Sociologists would create methods for "reaching
defectives and potential parents of defectives." Id.
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these questions. Perhaps, given her strong convictions about
ethnographies and what she intends by structural analysis,49 she
leaves this methodological bramble bush to other inquiring minds.
Although Austin faithfully accepts that ethnographies present
thicker, more diverse milieus out of which legal contests might
arise, we must take seriously the following question: How may
ethnography's
methodological
problems
confound
race
ethnographies?" ° At present, legal scholars who call themselves
Race Crits engage in a quasi-form of race ethnography, and from
the advent of this progressive legal scholarship, they have
questioned legal autonomy, rationality, neutrality, and
decontextualized critiques.5' They too have faced stringent, almost
strident, calls for methodological clarity."2 Ethnography analyzes
culture along qualitative methodologies. 3 Yet, culture takes many
forms. In its manifold ways, culture has many meanings. If
culture means "the acquired knowledge that people use to
interpret experience and generate social behavior," and if this
knowledge governs how people, individuals and groups, may see
their world,' 4 then it must follow that cultural and sub-cultural
norms operate within a given community. Equally important,
dominant or subaltern culture "category[z]es, encodes, and
otherwise defines the world in which they live."" If so, then on
which cultural norms will a given ethnographer rely?" How does
49. See Regina Austin, Of False Teeth and Biting Critiques:Jones v. Fisher
in Context, 15 TOURo L. REV. 389, 389-90 (1999) (outlining her nine-factor
structural analysis).
50. See Robert Dingwall, A Model for Challenging Sociology or Just
Microsociology?, 27 J. OF CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 399 (1998).

51. See, e.g., Reginald Leamon Robinson, Race, Myth, and Narrative in the
Social Construction of the Black Self, 40 HOw. L.J. 1 (1996).
52. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence,
34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1993); Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling
Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807
(1993); Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1745 (1989); Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits: O.J. Simpson,
CriticalRace Theory, the Law, and the Triumph of Color in America, THE NEW
REPUBLIC Dec. 9, 1996, at 27.
53. See Norman K. Denzin, The New Ethnography, 27 J. OF CONTEMP.
ETHNOGRAPHY 405, 406 (1998) (discussing four qualitative methodologies:

naturalism (being there, using the native's own words); ethnomethodology
(bracketing, description, the talk of how); emotionalism (creative interviewing,
performance texts, first-person accounts); and postmodernism (cinematic
society, psychoanalytic readings, poetic representations)).
54. Gillian M. McCombs, The Keys to the Kingdom Have Been Distributed:
An Organizational Analysis of an Academic Computer Center, 46 LIBR.
TRENDS 681 (Spring 1998).
55. Id.

56. See Denzin, supra note 53, at 405-06. Denzin writes:
[A] theory of the social is also a theory of writing. There is nothing
outside the text; that is, a thing is only understood through its
representations. Representations are gendered constructions. Hence, a
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an ethnographer's sociological method and psychoanalytical theory
bias her interpretations, note taking, descriptions, and intuitive
insights?57
This question bears directly on observing and
interpreting.5 8 According to Gillien McCombs:
Culture, the cognitive map to which we refer on a daily basis, cannot
be observed directly. It needs to be inferred and is predicated on
being able to get inside people's heads. This emphasis is thus
shifted from observation of behavior to the meaning of behavior,
from observation of phenomena such as customs, objects, and
emotions, to their meaning. An ethnographer "inscribes" social
discourse.59
Without taking up these methodological conundra, Austin
assumes that ethnographies can survive academic questions of
reliability, and she instead focuses her analytical foray not simply
on legal doctrine, but inclusively on cultural factors. At base,
ethnography, or cultural analysis, asks: "Before you impose your
theories on the people you study, find out how those people define
their world." ° Austin takes this injunction seriously. Her
challenge remains obvious: discovering how the subjects of her
paper define their world. By discovering these defining narratives,
these cultural myths, she provides an argument against imposing
standard legal theories on employment discrimination, an

theory of writing is also a theory of interpretive (ethnographic) work.
Theory, writing, and ethnography are inseparable material practices.
Together they create the conditions that locate the social inside the text.
Those who write about methods of knowing also write about theory,
culture, and society. Those who write culture also write theory. And
those who write theory write culture.
Id.
57. McCombs, supra note 54, at 682 (A professor of sociology described
herself as an ethnologist "who 'lived within worlds new to me, tried to
understand what they were about, and tried to write about my understandings
so that the worlds I studied come alive for others,"'

. . . .

describing "her work

as 'sociology as narrative, story, text, language' rather than that of numbers,
while being firmly undergirded by sociological method and psychoanalytical
theory.").
58. See R.D. LAING, THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE (1967).

See also R.D.

LAING, THE DIVIDED SHELF (1971); Robinson, supra note 6, at 172-79
(discussing Laing's theory in the context of race and its consciousness).
59. McCombs, supra note 54, at 684 (citing CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS (1973)).
60. Id. at 682. McCormbs states that:
The study of culture, known as ethnography, provides observations that
say "Before you impose your theories on the people you study, find out
how those people define their world." Ethnography has its origins in
field work expeditions to places like Samoa and the Kalahari desert and
has now become a fundamental tool for understanding ourselves and the
multicultural environment of which we are a part.
Id. (citation omitted).
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imposition that ratifies extant discriminatory practices. 6' For
Austin, standard legal theories and their analyses ignore these
narratives and myths, a claim long embraced and demonstrated by
Race Crits and critical theorists.2 By exposing yet again the limits
of the liberal legal imagination, Austin not only moves beyond the
manner in which courts apply doctrinal principles, but also reveals
the structural factors through which poor, low-status minorities
experience themselves, customers, and employers in the fast food
industry.63
To the extent that ethnographies can expose otherwise the
etiology of structural oppression, I agree with Professor Austin's
approach. By relying on ethnographies, she reveals structural
factors that bear directly on poor, low-status minorities' day-to-day
efforts to live, to liberate themselves, and to advance socially,
politically, and economically. 64 Likewise, her approach exposes the
structural factors that influence a court's reasoning, factors that
bind and delimit a judge's rationality.65 For many judges, legal
decision-making must function within evidentiary constraints,
rulings that embrace not sociological but legal facts.6 For Austin,

61. Cf. Kimberl Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1331 (1988).
62. See, e.g., Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies
and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987).
63. See, e.g., ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICTS AND
RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 98, 113-14 (1999).

On this

point, Yamamoto argues that:
[Rielational positionality significantly complicates fixed categories of
good and evil, of victims and victimizers. Relational positionality
acknowledges that "the flow of power in multiple systems of domination
is not always unidirectional. Indeed, "victims can also be victimizers;
agents of change can also be complicitous, depending on the particular
axis of power one considers." A women's [sic] potential for both
victimization and domination thus depends on her relational position
with other social actors. She may be oppressed under one system of
domination (patriarchy) and oppressive through others (race and class).
In terms of social agency, women (like racial groups) can be
simultaneously privileged and
subordinated, empowered
and
disempowered.
Id.
64. See KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, NO SHAME IN MY GAME: THE WORKING
POOR IN THE INNER CITY (1999).

65. By rationality, I simply mean that an actor like a judge constructs an
objective, and she pursues that objective by choosing among various
alternatives, given the limited (or bounded) information before her, that she
believes attains the final objective. See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE
BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATION
ORGANIZATIONS 62 (3d ed. 1976).
66. Austin, supra note 4 at 207. Austin argues:
Not being particularly interested in the material/social interactions and
positioning of the parties that lead up to lawsuits or the material/social
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without sociological facts or structural factors which surface when
one considers ethnographies, legal rulings become enigmas. Yet,
for judges who seek more ways to explain how structural factors or
structural oppression might work against poor, low-status
minorities and how legal precedent cannot seriously redress these
"built-in headwinds," Professor Austin's use of ethnographies
proffers an analysis that remains at once insightful, probative, and
provocative.
Yet, Austin's ethnographic approach stops quite short of
drawing for us a complete sociological picture. Quite rightly,
Austin reminds judges that they analyze legal questions within a
specific structural context (i.e., white supremacy and employment
discrimination). Unfortunately, she ignores interpersonal (and
interactional) dynamics, and how these dynamics contribute
powerful energy to personal experiences." For me, concepts like
structural oppression and employment discrimination have no
living value without human, mental energy. In the abstract, this
oppression and discrimination exist like bullets, which without
human intervention, cannot maim or kill. If we combine bullets
and guns, we still live in relative safety. By loading bullets into
guns, by fearing differences, by using differences to justify
imposing violence and brutality on others," and by using guns to
enforce feared differences, we have added human, mental energy
to structural factors. Thus, the structural framework out of which
guns and bullets come must be infinitely valuable, but alone this
framework has severe limitations. 9 And while I do not intend to
trivialize the ravages of slave violence and Jim Crow segregation, I
consequences of decisions after they have been rendered, legal analysis
as it is reflected in curt opinions often leaves out much that lay people
would consider crucial to an assessment of whether justice has been
done.

Id.
67. Cf. Thomas M. Vander Ven, Fear or Victimization and the Interactional
Construction of Harassment in a Latino Neighborhood, 27 J. OF CONTEMP.
ETHNOGRAPHY 374 (1998) (arguing that people who are victimized identify
themselves by their behavior toward those who they fear in their
neighborhood).
68. See MEMMI, supra note 1, at 52-53 ("Racism is a mode of behavior, but
it is also a discourse, the presentation of a case, both as an accusation and a
self-exoneration. The meaning of the argument is hardly in doubt, however; it
is always a justification of aggressive hostility.").
69. Cf. M. Tina Dacin et al., The Embeddedness of Organizations:Dialogue
and Directions, 25 J. OF MGMT. 317 (May-June 1999). These authors argue:
There emerged dissatisfaction with organizational theory conceptions of

context as primarily resource environments or as a set of constraints or
opportunities that regulate, as well as provide resources (tangible and
intangible) and transaction opportunities. This resource focus tends to
overlook or downplay the constitutive or "productive" effects on action
possibilities of an organization's internal and external context.
Id. (citations omitted).
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think that race consciousness, albeit a concept, perhaps explains
the negative racial experiences poor, low-status minorities have in
the fast food industry. Under an approach that perforce takes
stock of how poor, low-status minorities think about themselves
and others, we ought to hesitate when it comes to blaming
structural oppression completely and exclusively, treating
oppression as if it were a powerful explanatory variable. Under a
race consciousness approach, we could, without ignoring racial
discrimination, assess the personal responsibility of blacks,
whites, and others. ° Although Austin knows of personality
factors, her article ignores them completely. By focusing only on
structural factors and by failing to combine structural factors and
interpersonal dynamics, Austin's analysis by necessity has limited
efficacy.
Recall that ethnologists must learn how people construct their
world. How does a purely structuralist approach account for how
individuals think? It cannot. Rather, structuralism presumes
that white supremacy, albeit invisible, has real and concrete
effects on black people's lives, and the cultural expression of
structural oppression limits and constrains how black people
think, feel, and act. 1 If so, what we have learned is that black
people think, feel, and act as structural oppression (e.g., white
supremacy) and racial discrimination necessarily dictate. Where
is human agency?
Equally important, where is personal
responsibility, especially for how different people, including blacks,
construct their personal worlds by their individual (or collective)
thinking? At base, not withstanding a structural framework,
everyone thinks and creates his or her own social reality!" For
example, how do we explain why some blacks succeed, even those
who came from "broken" homes, who grew up in dank ghettos, who
lived under the financial rigors of public welfare? By not looking
critically to interpersonal dynamics and epistemology, structural
oppression can become an analytical blinder, and we simply have
found a much more powerful tool like ethnographic data to utter
yet again that white supremacy and racial discrimination
victimize blacks."8 And while the fast food industry offers us a
70. See generally PAUL L. WACHTEL, RACE IN THE MIND OF AMERICA:
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES (1999).
71. See ALLAN G. JOHNSON, THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY

315 (1999) (defining structuralism).
72. See TALBOT, supra note 46, at 37-39 (based on western physicists and
eastern mystics, arguing that people create their own realities because what
they experience correlates or is caused by their thoughts).
73. Cf. MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTHIWHITE
WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1995) (arguing that

racialized state policy (e.g., black slavery and Jim Crow segregation) and the
concomitant sedimentation of inequality explain the current material and

asset difference between whites and blacks).
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specialized case study for the manner and form in which racial
discrimination gets expressed, it still leads to the same old saw:
blacks are victims.
In effect, a structural factor analysis of the fast food industry
denies that blacks have been influenced, principally by their
primary (family) and secondary (school) environs, to embrace a life
philosophy that recruits them into an army of similarly thinking
nay sayers, a meditation that in mantra-like fashion preaches:
blacks cannot succeed unless whites stop discriminating against
them. Let us assume that society lies to black children by
programming them to believe the cultural myths told to them:
blacks are ugly, violent, lazy, welfare-sucking people who will
never amount to anything. ' How did that child first come to the
lie and to believe in it? Psychiatrist Price Cobbs, of Black Rage,"
states: "I fear that people like Tim - and I certainly hear him will begin to believe the lies that are told about him. I hear 'A lot
of people like me will never make anything of themselves. Once I
believe that lie, they got me."'76 Is the source of this oppressive,
marginalizing narrative an invisible structural technology that
sows self-destructive seeds in the minds of poor, low-status
minorities? Who then are the astute "farmers"? Are they parents,
friends, teachers, media, etc? If so, then the gun that first fired
the oppressive bullet into the child's forehead must have been a
parent or a close family relative!77 Just as writing, theory, and
culture have inextricable
links, macro-structure
works
interdependently with micro-structures. Just as macro and microstructures of racial oppression must be immutably conjoined, race
discrimination as a daily phenomenon depends fundamentally on
infecting blacks, whites, and others."8
Finally, by not accounting for individual narratives and how

74. See ROBERT E. ORNSTEIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 47-8
(1975). Ornstein correctly writes that:
Previous experience with objects and events strengthens personal
category system as it does a scientific paradigm. We expect cars to
make a certain noise, traffic lights to be a certain color, food to smell a

certain way, and certain people to say certain things. But what we
actually experience ... is the category which is evoked by a particular
stimulus, not the occurrence in the external world.
Id.
75. See WILLIAM H. GRIER & PRICE M. COBBS, BLACK RAGE (1966).
76. IN THEIR OWN WORDS, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 19, 1995, at D4, available
in 1995 WL 4908685.
77. See PATRICIA RAYBON, MY FIRST WHITE FRIEND: CONFESSIONS ON
RACE, LOVE, AND FORGIVENESS 3 (1996) ("I knew the stories [of whites
murdering blacks with impunity]. I had heard them in childhood, at the knees

of people I loved, in the presence of people I trusted. Terrible stories. Horror
stories.").

78. See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 326 (arguing that we, blacks, whites,
and others are infected with racism).
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such constructs strongly influence our experiences, a structural
analysis assumes that racial oppression runs from oppressors to
the oppressed, from white to black (or poor, low-status minorities),
a self-destroying process in which the disempowered play no
meaningful part. While ethnographies certainly help by exposing
how structural oppression deeply contextualizes the ways poor,
low-status minorities experience themselves and others in the fast
food industry, we still cannot know why some minorities succeed
and others fail. Without psychoanalytic and cognitive theories, we
cannot appreciate how existential and epistemological factors
make us central players in our personal experiences of success or
failure.
Furthermore,
by not addressing
underlying
methodological difficulties with ethnographic studies, Austin fails
to tell us to what extent sociologists or ethnologists have found
ways to reframe dominant narratives, ultimately leaving the
reader with a sympathetic accounting of subjects, one that reveals
an intuitive epiphany that potentially weakens an oppressive
thought system."9 In the end, I would argue that ethnographies
help, but without an incisive critique that takes the courts, race
scholars, and readers beyond the historic boogey man of white
structural oppression as a super explanatory variable,
ethnographies have limited efficacy. Without more, we find
ourselves once again positioned to think in dichotomous terms:
white oppressors, black victims; white guilt, black rage.

III. STRUCTURAL OPPRESSION, INDIVIDUAL PERSONALITY, OR BOTH?
A. Bad Attitudes and Employment Discrimination
What explains employment discrimination in the fast food
industry? To what extent is this discrimination related to the
manner in which our society has constructed poor, low-status
minorities? To what extent is this discrimination co-determinant
with the specific ways in which poor, low-status minorities
actually behave in the workplace? Are these discriminatory
practices driven by structural oppression or by organizational
efficiency? Even if efficiency proves to be the overwhelming
motive, can practices based on rationalizing the bottom line
operate independent of biases, prejudices, ignorance, and racism?
Are discriminatory practices specifically related to a manager's or
an owner's aggregate experiences with black employees? Did
these employees have bad attitudes? Did they provide erstwhile
customers with poor service? Did they react negatively to white or
minority managers in a way that disrupted the workplace?
79. See generally DAVID BOHM, THOUGHT AS A SYSTEM 18 (1993) (By

thought system, Bohm means one process, a "whole society sharing thoughts it's all one process.").
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Nevertheless, when black injured applicants, employees, or
customers seek civil redress, do courts look beyond legal doctrine
and traditional evidentiary indicia for a context that accounts for
the perhaps unique perspective of poor, low-status minorities like
blacks?
As I have already pointed out, Austin's ethnographic
approach and critical analysis answer these questions in the
negative. What is most important about Austin's work is not the
legal analysis but the ethnographic studies that expose
institutional or cultural practices that appear to disadvantage
poor, low-status minorities.
Why then are poor, low-status
minorities advantaged? Preliminarily, it appears that fast food
employers ordinally rank potential employees: Latino immigrants
over indigenous blacks; immigrant blacks over indigenous blacks;
distant neighborhood minorities over immediate neighborhood
minorities."0 Furthermore, these minorities do not speak Spanish,
Tagalog, or Korean. Moreover, given the discipline and organizing
structure of the fast food industry, minority or white owners may
wrongly assume that poor, low-status minorities like wage-earning
blacks will not willingly conform to workplace rules, especially
norms governing politeness to customers, at any cost."'
To
overcome these experienced or perceived difficulties with blacks,
these owners rely on informal networks to find and hire new
workers." And by so relying, poor, low-status minorities like
wage-earning blacks have correspondingly fewer opportunities for
management positions.83
Fortunately, these problems can be redressed to some degree
by traditional disparate impact analysis, especially where testers
can effectively document discriminatory hiring patterns. 4 Yet,
what of the tension between bad attitudes and poor service? How
does structural oppression account for or explain these workplace
difficulties? Is it simply that fast food owners prefer Latino
immigrants over native-born blacks or whites?
Do these
employees have a greater propensity for hard work? Do they have

80. Austin, supra note 4, at 216.

81. Id. at 218.
82. See id.; Cf. MARY C. WATERS, BLACK IDENTITIES: WEST INDIAN
IMMIGRANT DREAMS AND AMERICAN REALITIES 102 (1999). Waters writes:
Immigrants are also embedded in networks that can provide

information and referrals to job opportunities in a way that natives
often are not .... [T]he ready-made networks and the absence of an
aversion to low-status jobs ... could explain the much higher labor
force participation rates among unskilled, poorly educated West Indians
relative to unskilled, poorly educated native-born blacks.
Id.
83. Austin, supra note 4, at 217-19.
84. Id. at 211-13 (discussing Shirley v. Vicnat in which a class action suit
against the fast food restaurant owner included mostly testers).
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better, owner-oriented attitudes?85 Katherine Newman pointed
out that Burger Barn, a fast food restaurant in Harlem, New York
City, imposes an ethic of customer deference on its employees.86
Without regard to ethnographies, the fast food industry prefers
employees who relate effectively (displaying patient politeness)
with the other workers and customers,87 even if a customer acts
rudely.88 Positive, cooperative attitudes, perhaps even deference to
authority, benefit all players, especially an owner's profit margin."
An employee with these personality attributes more than likely
will proffer good services to customers, thereby aiding an owner's
profit taking. By contrast, owners disprefer blacks who have bad
attitudes, chips on their shoulders, distrust toward supervisors,
and remedy-seeking or litigious-oriented coping skills." A worker
with these personality attributes will more than likely contribute
to, if not cause, workplace conflicts with co-workers and with the
public. In the end, can we simply say that fast food owners,
regardless of their race or ethnicity, prefer good workers, leaving
the irate do-nothing to her own whims? What do ethnographic
studies contribute to understanding how bad attitudes flow from
structural oppression?
85. Id. at 218.
86. NEWMAN, supra note 64, at 89. According to Newman:
Burger Barn workers are told that they must, at whatever costs to their
own dignity, defer to the public. Customers can be unreasonably
demanding, rude, even insulting, and workers must count backwards
from a hundred in an effort to stifle their outrage. Servicing the
customer with a smile pleases management because making money
depends on keeping the clientele happy, but it can be an exercise in
humiliation for teenagers. It is hard for them to refrain from reading
this public nastiness as another instance of society's low estimation of
their worth. But they soon realize that if they want to hold on to their
minimum-wage jobs, they have to tolerate comments that would almost
certainly provoke a fistfight outside the workplace.
Id.
87. Austin, supra note 4, at 217-19.
88. NEWMAN, supra note 64, at 92-93. Consider the perspective of a worker
on why non-working customers may give her a hard time, especially when
they know that these fast food employees must tolerate "whatever verbal
abuse comes across the counter." Id. at 89. The worker states:
What you will find in any situation, more so in the black community, is
that if you are in the community and you try to excel, you will get
ridicule from your own peers. It's like the "crabs down" syndrome ....
According to my thinking, they should pull 'em up or push 'em or help
'em get out. But the crabs pull him back in the barrel. That's just an
analogy for what happens in the community a lot.
Id. at 92-93 (alteration in original).
89. Id. at 92. ("The problem [of customer antagonism] is constant enough to
warrant official company policies on how crew members should respond to
insults, on what managers should do to help, on the evasive tactics that will
work best to quell an ugly situation without losing the business.").
90. Austin, supra note 4, at 216-19.
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Given that Austin argues in favor of race ethnographies, it is
vital that we know if bad workplace attitudes correlate strongly
with structural oppression. Basically, does structural oppression
dictate the relatively precise manner in which poor, low-class
minorities like wage-earning blacks will react to authoritative or
racist managers, nasty customers, or "dissing" co-workers? 1 By
asking these questions, I seek the specific relevance of
ethnographies to bring forth structural data or perhaps in the best
case admissible evidentiary material on which courts can
sufficiently rely to render a plaintiff-oriented verdict, where bad
attitudes lead to civil suits, to damage-seeking harangues."
By looking to ethnographic studies, Austin suggests that
ethnologists can provide courts with admissible evidentiary data
that could better contextualizes employment discrimination in the
fast food industry. For example, Katherine Newman, a sociologist
and ethnologist, offers several reasons why bad attitudes, which
may contribute to poor service, may typify poor, low-status
minorities in the fast food industry. First, blacks must cope with
America's moral maxim that work defines the person." On this
point, Newman writes,
We inhabit an unforgiving culture that is blind to the many reasons
why some people cross that employment barrier and others are left
behind. While we may remember, for a time, that unemployment
rates are high, or that particular industries have downsized millions
91. See NEWMAN, supra note 64, at 145. Newman writes:
In a world where residential segregation is sharp and racial antagonism
no laughing matter, it is striking how well workers get along with one
another. Friendships develop across lines that have hardened in the
streets. Romances are born between African-Americans and Puerto
Ricans, legendary antagonists in the neighborhoods beyond the
workplace. This is even more remarkable when one considers the
competition that these groups are locked into in a declining labor
market. They know very well that employers are using race- and classbased preferences to decide who gets a job, and that their ability to
foster the employment chances of friends and family members may well
be compromised by a manager's racial biases. One can hear in their
conversations behind the counter complaints about how they cannot get
their friends jobs because - they believe - the manager wants to pick
immigrants first and leave the native-born jobless. In this context,
resentment builds against unfair barriers. Even so, workers of different
ethnic backgrounds are able to reach across the walls of competition and
cultural difference.
Id.
92. See Austin, supra note 4, at 228 n. 86 (discussing Robertson v. Burger
King, 848 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. La. 1994), in which black customer sued because
white customers, who were standing behind him, were served before him.
Both the manager and employee were black, and given Shirley v. Vicnat case,
it appears irrelevant whether a minority or white person owned this fast food
restaurant).
93. See NEWMAN, supranote 64, at 86-89.

The John Marshall Law Review

[34:245

of workers right out of a job, or that racial barriers or negative
attitudes toward teenagers make it harder to get ajob at some times
and for some people, in the end American culture wipes these
background truths out in favor of a simpler dichotomy:94 the worthy
and the unworthy, the working stiff and the lazy sloth.
Second, given this puritanical maxim, a "McJob" does not
uplift but denigrates poor, low-status minorities. Fast food jobs
like a "Mc Job" stigmatize a worker, challenge her self-esteem, and
lack redemptive value.95 Another factor is that these jobs falsely
appear routinized and unskilled96 (i.e., "Any fool could do this job.
Are you kidding?"),97 robbing workers of creative, individual ways
to express themselves and to find their identities. By feeling
forced to become a shift worker, poor, low-status minorities may
feel preordained to remain trapped in urban ghettos.9
Furthermore, another factor is poor, low-status minorities may
lack personal discipline, especially when they feel confronted by
rude customers (black, white, Latino, Asian, or recent immigrants)
to whom they must defer.99 Consider Ianna, managing to react to
customer rudeness in ways perhaps just shy of violating a
restaurant's ethic of deference, who states: "And no matter what
you do you cannot please them. I'm not supposed to say anything
to the customer, but that's not like me. I have a mouth and I don't
take no short from nobody. I don't care who it is, don't take
anybody's crap."' °
Notwithstanding these factors, how do
ethnographic studies lead to the thick, legal contextual analysis
upon which courts can rely to better understand how structural
oppression correlates with bad attitudes and poor service?
Although Austin does not use ethnographic data to answer
this question directly, she does proffer another way to explain bad

94. Id. at 86.
95. Id. at 89.
96. Id. at 148 ("[Her experience] reveals the hidden knowledge locked up
inside what appears to surface observers (and to many employees themselves)
as a job that requires no thinking, no planning, and no skill.").
97. Id. at 149.
98. NEWMAN, supra note 64, at 88.
The creation of an identity as a worker is never achieved by individuals
moving along some preordained path .... This is a particularly
dramatic transformation for ghetto youth and adults, for they face a
difficult job market, high hurdles in convincing employers to take a
chance on them, and relatively poor rewards - from a financial point of
view - for their successes.
Id. at 96-97 (describing how William who, after taking a job at Burger Barn,
used every conceivable subterfuge to conceal his job from his friends: "It's not
something I personally proclaim with pride and stuff ....If you are a crew
member, you really aren't shit there ....You got nothing there, no benefits,
nothing. It was like that [when I was younger] and it's like that now.").
99. Id. at 86, 91-92.
100. Id. at 91.
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attitudes of poor, low-status minorities in the fast food industry.
Austin, looking to Jennifer Anne Parker, a sociologist, writes that
"blacks' bad attitudes are not simply a matter of individual
psychology or a response to conditions external to the workplace.
They may be the product of blacks' resistance, not to work in
general, but to the conditions of the particular workplace."" ' In
effect, blacks, who have bad attitudes, are akin to Austin's
lawbreakers who engage in deviate-oriented or extra-legal praxis,
all designed to expose society's material oppression and to redeem
themselves by acting "outside the law, against the law, and around
the law." °2 It would appear that when we read Austin's "The Black
Community," together with Parker's position, we can arrive at the
following critique of structural oppression. Blacks engage in bad
attitudes, often leading to poor service if they are employees as an
indictment of their racialized context, because structural
oppression has nuanced levels. First, structural oppression has0 a3
specific historical origin, viz., slavery and Jim Crow politics.
Second, the fast food industry serves as a site for macro-micro
oppression. On a macro level, the industry privileges social norms
that work stereotypically against poor, low-status minorities. On
a micro level, a specific fast food restaurant like McDonald's
articulates these shared meanings of values when owners refuse to
hire blacks, when managers treat workers with racialized distain,
and when employees or managers disrespect black customers by
either refusing to serve them or by treating them as criminal
trespassers." To this extent, I would imagine that Austin would
agree that blacks should engage in some form of praxis-oriented
resistance, a protest designed to draw society's attention to hidden
problems within the fast food industry. Likewise, I would suspect
that Austin would agree with Parker's theoretical treatment of the
complex nature of structural oppression.
Yet, does this
ethnographic critique of structural oppression broaden how a court
might determine what facts necessarily constitute actionable
discrimination or public accommodation violations?'0 '
Parker proffers additional ethnographic data that bear on bad
attitudes in the fast food industry by poor, low-status minorities
like wage-earning blacks. Parker focuses on structural markers
like "disempowerment," and although Austin disagrees with
Parker when she dichotomizes racial bigotry and the fast food
industry's organizational structure (i.e., service orientation),

101. Austin, supranote 4, at 219 (italics in original text).

102. Austin, supranote 39, at 1816.
103. Austin, supranote 4, at 222.
104. Id., at 229-31 (citing Alexis v. McDonald's Restaurantsof Mass., Inc., 67

F.3d 341 (1st Cir. 1995)).
105. Id. at 231 (citing Wells v. Burger King Corp., 40 F. Supp.2d 1366 (N.D.
Fl. 1998)).
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technological advances, and competition among individual fast
food restaurants,' she does not critically deconstruct Parker's
facile reliance on "disempowerment" as an explanatory variable.
According to Parker,
"[Tihe lack of motivation," "the lack of enthusiasm" managers speak
of and which they claim to be manifestations of "bad attitude" may
simply represent disempowerment due to their social conditions and
the feeling - both physical and psychological - that stems from...
"the cycle that never ends." Disempowerment is expressed through
tiredness, lack of energy... and lack of desire to work in a way that
expresses enthusiasm. But this manifestation of disempowerment
is interpreted by managers as a lack of motivation to work, a lack of
a "positive attitude," rather than as rooted in disempowerment
itself. It becomes a vicious circle. "Bad attitude" is caused by over
work, and unfulfilled expectations regarding work. Bad attitude is
reinforced by oppressive conditions including low wages and lack of
promotion opportunities. 107
At this juncture, Parker's language and theory should invite
Austin's critical interpretations.
Yet, Austin refuses this
invitation. For me, Parker's language and theory suffer from
unexpressed assumptions, a theoretical framework that confirms
that ethnologists observe, write, and theorize through socially
constructed lenses that inform and influence how they re-present
what is real.0 8 First, what does motivate mean? What does
motivation look like? Second, what does enthusiasm mean? Who
determines its content and substantive borders? Third, and most
important, what does disempowered mean?
Specifically, does disempowerment affect all poor, low-status
workers like wage-earning blacks equally and similarly? If not,
106. Austin, supra note 4, at 211-12.
107. Id. at 210 (citing Jennifer Anne Parker, Labor, Culture, and Capital in
Corporate Fast Food Restaurant Franchises: Global and Local Interactions
Among an Immigrant Workforce in New York City (1996) (unpublished
dissertation)). See NEWMAN, supra note 64, at 94. Newman writes:
The fast food industry is actually very good about internal promotion.
Workplace management is nearly always recruited from the ranks of
entry-level workers. Carefully planned training programs make it
possible for employees to move up, to acquire transferable skills, and to
at least take a shot at entrepreneurial ownership. McDonald's, for
example, is proud of the fact that half of its board of directors started
out as crew members. One couldn't say as much for the rest of the
nation's Fortune 500 firms.
Id.; Austin, supra note 4, at 217 ("Managers are drawn from among the ranks
of the workers; given the preference for non-black workers there were
accordingly few blacks in the management track. Since the managers hire the
workers and the Latino and Asian managers sometimes had very limited
English skills, they tended to hire their own group.").
108. See Denzin, supra note 53, at 408 ("By reality, they reference 'a world of
possible things ... [that] exists prior to its mediation by signs and signs of
signs.,').
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then why are certain groups of blacks affected? If affected, how do
these blacks perceive the world? Does this perception partially
explain why they refuse to take personal responsibility for their
behavior in the fast food workplace? If so, then how does this
mechanism work? How do blacks, haling from different socioeconomic settings, receive this message? If they all receive this
message by unique or varied delivery systems, how is it that
people like Bill Cosby or Reginald Lewis or Lena Horne or Maxine
Waters, all of whom come from different communities and were
exposed to different family values, have succeeded? If all blacks
directly or indirectly receive this message of disempowerment, can
we presume
that different existential
philosophies or
epistemological processes have marginal influence over how blacks
make choices in their day-to-day lives? In the end, can we
conclude that structural oppression, which exists invisibly within
normalized cultural values, expresses itself in part as
disempowerment, and therefore white society should not hold
blacks morally culpable or ethically responsible for their day-today choices, even if they engage in extra-legal praxis as protest
against white supremacy?
Equally important, how does Parker's facile use of
disempowerment explain the manner in which many African,
Caribbean, Asian, and Latino immigrants have succeeded in this
country?
I do not presuppose by this question that these
immigrants do not face racial discrimination. 9 They too suffer
unnecessarily under the same racially discriminatory practices
that have plagued this country's black, Asian, and Latino
citizens." Nevertheless, immigrants (e.g., Dominicans, Haitians,
Jamaicans, West Africans, and South Americans) who chain
migrate into New York work extremely long hours to meet family
needs, especially because they remain ineligible for government
benefits that native-born families receive."'
In addition,
legislative assaults against immigrants limit supplemental income
streams to the working poor, and as a consequence, Dominican
families "have responded to the high cost of living by putting 1as
12
many of their members into the labor market as they can spare."
Not only does Parker's use of disempowerment fail to account for
immigrant success, she also fails, as does Austin, to look critically
as the different race consciousness attitudes of immigrants. " 3

109. See Mari Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, AntidiscriminationLaw,
and a Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991).
110. See Reginald Leamon Robinson, "The Other Against Itself':
Deconstructing the Violent Discourse Between Korean and African Americans,
67 S. CAL. L. REV. 15 (1993).
111. NEWMAN, supra note 64, at 192-93.
112. Id. at 60.
113. See WATERS, supra note 82, at 101 ("Immigrants are more likely than
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According to Mary C. Waters,
[Tihe immigrants' unique understanding and expectations of race
relations allow them to interact with American racial structures in a
successful way. Specifically, their low anticipation of sour race
relations allows them to have better interpersonal interactions with
white Americans than many native African Americans. Because
they come from a society with a majority of blacks and with many
blacks in high positions, the immigrants have high ambitions and
expectations. Yet their experience with blocked economic mobility
due to race and their strong racial identities lead them to challenge
blocked mobility in a very militant fashion when they encounter it.
This combination of high ambitions, friendly relations with whites
on an interpersonal level, and strong militance in encountering any
perceived discrimination leads to some better outcomes in the labor
market for West Indians than for black Americans." 4
By not critically reading what Parker might have meant by
disempowerment, Austin implicitly suggests that this construct
operates as an explanatory variable that follows necessarily from
structural oppression. At the same time, Austin lets pass the
opportunity to look critically at individual attitudes and racial
consciousness among native-born blacks and immigrant
communities. Equally important, she fails to disaggregate the
immigrant community's work ethic, treating them all for purposes
of her critique of the fast food industry as monolithic. By ignoring
attitudinal differences between immigrants and native-born blacks
and by suggesting a unitary work ethics among immigrant
communities, Parker's disempowerment provides poor, low-status
minorities like wage-earning blacks not only with a vehicle to
perceive racial discrimination where perhaps it does not exist, but
also with a basis to blame their personality issues on structural
oppression.
But if disempowerment becomes the causative
variable that explains why blacks have bad attitudes and weaken,
if not disturbed, states of mind, then how do welfare or better
employment opportunities make a difference? Public welfare can
help, and yet it can demoralize recipients, leaving the poor
temporarily buoyed, perennially and psychologically injured, or
both. Equally important, in order to acquire better employment
opportunities, poor, low-status workers like wage-earning blacks
should think not about the vagaries of structural oppression, but
about building marketable talents such as enhanced memories,
inventory control, positive interpersonal relations with diverse
people, etc. By focusing on these talents and by transferring them
to different work settings, blacks could "parlay their 'human
natives to accept low-wage, low-status jobs because the immigrant's sense of
self is not as bound up with the job. Immigrants will judge jobs based on
comparisons with the opportunities available to them in their own country.").
114. Id. at 7.
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capital' into jobs."" 5 Yet, by suggesting that disempowerment
justifies bad attitudes, then poor, low-status workers may find it
easier to think of fast food jobs as de-skilling, bottom rung, and
stigmatized work experiences. In so doing, these workers refuse to
look at themselves, their thinking, their personality, and their
day-to-day choices, even if they know full well that structural
oppression may still remain a social "reality."
B. Bad Black Customers and Poor Service
How do ethnographic data aid courts and race scholars in
drawing a causal or correlative link between how blacks
experience fast food dining and the quality of service that they
receive? For Austin, these data provide a complex context, so that
we can understand a black person's expectation when she takes
her family, rather infrequently, to a fast food restaurant. Given
these data, Austin reveals how nuanced and complex that
experience might be, especially because social, economic, race, and
personality variables all come into contact. Yet, it is still unclear
exactly how a court might use these data so that legal analyses
and holdings move beyond traditional doctrinal application. As
Austin certainly points out, ethnographic data problematize any
hard conclusion that race may not
factor into how fast food
1
customers.'"
black
treat
restaurants
By relying on ethnographies, Austin recreates the complex
context out of which tensions arise between black customers and
fast food restaurants. Given their socio-economic circumstances,
blacks infrequently patronize fast food restaurants. When they do,
it is a very special family moment, which they hope will be devoid
of the problems they might face at a full-service restaurant.
Moreover, blacks seek an egalitarian experience, perhaps where
they do not have to wonder unnecessarily about how a server
might treat them, seat them, respond to their needs, or relate to
them generally. Like most others, blacks would prefer to eat in
relative safety, treating fast food restaurants near and far as
oasis."'
In some cases, however, they co-created what they considered
poor service, attributing some if not all of it to racially
discriminatory practices. Therefore when they were displeased,
having gone to such expense or having traveled very far, they took
legal action or openly expressed their ire." 8 Not all such instances
were racially motivated. Some fast food restaurants had policies
against too many orders at the drive-through window," 9 and in one
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

NEWMAN, supra note 64, at 148.
Austin, supra note 4, at 239.
Id. at 224-227.
Id. at 227-33.
Id. at 231-32 (citing Wells v. Burger King, 40 F. Supp.2d 1366 (N.D.
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of Austin's examples a fast food restaurant denied a black
customer use of its bathroom because it was broken.12 ° Apart from
the obvious cases of racially discriminatory practices, black
customers truly believed that they had suffered not just poor
service but illegal treatment. The ethnographic data contextualize
why blacks may react with such animus if they feel that they
suffered this illegal treatment. This context bears directly on
structural oppression, on racial discrimination, and on perceptions
held by both blacks and whites. What Austin does not tell us is
how ethnographies, especially in cases where blacks may have
misperceived their experiences, could better correlate thinking,
acts, and experiences. We do not know how courts and race
scholars can use instances where blacks suffered needless
discriminatory practices and where blacks perhaps misperceived
their experiences to move toward racial healing. Instead, Austin
leaves it to us to wonder how better to prove that poor service
could be racially discriminatory.
In writing race ethnography, it is vitally important that we
look critically and analytically at blacks, whites, and others.
Given the work of race scholars, we have learned the many
intimate and subtle ways in which structural oppression and
racial discrimination might work. Nevertheless, we must continue
to study the manifold ways in which industries like fast food might
engage in such practices, especially where this industry might
work to discourage the patronage of black customers who might
frighten white customers elsewhere. 2' However, as I argued
earlier, by focusing only on structural oppression as if it causally
injures historically marginalized people like blacks, we simply
miss the larger point. As Austin's work clearly shows, corporate
structure has recruited immigrant workers, and by organizing
their workplace along informal networks, even if for efficiency
purposes, the fast food industry diminishes employment
opportunities for poor, low-status workers like blacks. I would
argue that the larger point includes a critical, analytical inspection
of how such workers participate in their own oppression,22
principally by looking at how they think, use, and act on race.1
Race scholars should also study how these factors inform workers'
racial identity and influence how they interpret their day-to-day
Fla. 1998)).
120. Id. at 228-29 (citing Perry v. S.Z. Restaurant Corp., 45 F. Supp.2d 272
(S.D. N.Y. 1999))
121. Id. at 239.

122. See Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Shifting Race-Consciousness
Matrix and the Multiracial Category Movement: A Critical Reply to Professor
Hernandez, 20 B.C. Third World L.J. 231, 236 (2000) ("[D]oes race necessarily

have an essential meaning outside of how we think, use and talk about race? I
think not! Thinking, talking, and using give race its life force, content, and

meaning (e.g., racism)").
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reality.'23 By relying on ethnographies to understand this thinking
by blacks, whites, and others, race scholars can develop a much
more complex and highly nuanced understanding of racial
oppression. Despite the article's great work, Austin leaves us only
with a traditional approach to racial oppression-that which runs
from whites to blacks, from the oppressors to oppressed.
When I argue that ethnographies could help us better
understand the phenomenon of the "bad black customer," I mean
that these sociological and anthropological studies could develop
models for critically understanding race consciousness. By race
consciousness, I mean that America conditions its citizens to
identify with a racial group, and by so identifying, a black person,
for example, can be influenced to think of herself as inferior. And
this negative self-esteem can affect how she relates not only to
herself and to other minorities but also whites. Sometimes a
person may be unaware that she thinks poorly of herself, and
sometimes a person may openly assert a positive or negative idea
of herself. She may at times hold positive, negative, and neutral
images of herself.'24 What is most important is that a race
consciousness originates in a specific social context like slavery,
Ultimately,
Jim Crow politics, and racial discrimination.'25
lynching, ghettoes, poor education, black-on-black crime, broken
families, and self-hatred must have spawned a quality of race
too. 126
consciousness quietly harbored and openly hawked by blacks
How does this race consciousness by blacks work with
ethnographies about the fast food industry? It would appear that
they could help courts and legal scholars understand how such
about racial identity influences particularized
thinking

123. Cf MICHAEL A. GOMEZ, EXCHANGING OUR COUNTRY MARKS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AFRICAN IDENTITIES IN THE COLONIAL AND ANTEBELLUM
SOUTH (1998) (looking at history to 1830, the author examines the
transformation of slaves from an African cosmology to an identity forged out of

their slave experiences; how this new identity influenced how they interpreted
their reality; and how this new interpretation was passed on to their
descendants).
124. Janet E. Helms, Introduction:Review of Racial Identity Terminology, in

BLACK AND WHITE RACIAL IDENTITY 3, 7 (Janet E. Helms ed., 1990).
ONE NATION'S
125. See generally F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK?
DEFINITION (1991).

Anyway, black people are all colors. White people don't look all the
same way, but there are more different kinds of us than there are of
them... Many of the white people I see are black as far as I can tell by
the way they look. Now, that's it for looks. Looks don't mean much.
The things that makes [sic] us different is how we think. What we
believe is important, the ways we look at life.
Id. at 1.
126. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
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experiences.'27 Consider Michael Talbot's point that we impose our
preconceived notions on an event or thing, thus never experiencing
anything but our prejudices.' 28 Although she examines structural
oppression of and racial discriminatory practices against poor, lowstatus workers like blacks and black customers, Austin leaves this
vitally important, but integral, inquiry outside of her article's
scope.
Nevertheless, we must look askance at easy moves,
undoubtedly governed by a race consciousness, that lead black
customers to conclude that racism determines experiences and
justifies their righteous indignation. It must be the case that due
to the ubiquity of race in our culture, fast food employees may hold
unconscious, even unintentional, racist motivations. 21 9 At this
level of the unconscious, the behavior that leads to poor service or
that constructs them as "bad customer" might not be actionable. If
true, then why are black customers much more willing to see
racism as a better explanatory variable?
As Austin correctly points out, we may have real difficulty
discerning between misunderstandings about and overreactions to
poor service.2 ° What then is a bad black customer? Equally
important, what is poor service? These questions mimic earlier
questions: what is motivation or enthusiasm or bad attitude? As
such, if we cannot easily distinguish between bad service that
moves from a racial animus, then should we be equally interested
in why blacks wish to see racism and discriminatory service where
it may not at the very least consciously operate? As Charles
Lawrence aptly argues, racism affects us all, and if true, then it
would certainly appear that blacks carry this social toxin."'
Equally important, it could color their perspective so that by
thinking that a thing is present, then it is present.
As such, can we properly ask: is that which is like unto itself
drawn?"' Do thoughts create reality? 133 Are highly emotional
thoughts, whether positive or negative, responsible for our
experiences?.
In modern physics, based on Carl Jung's
127. See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTION (1972).
128. See TALBOT, supra note 46, at 3.
129. See generally Oppenheimer, supra note 16.
130. Austin, supra note 4, at 232.
131. Lawrence, supra note 16, at 326 ("We cannot be individually blamed for
unconsciously harboring attitudes that are inescapable in a culture permeated
with racism.").
132. See generally JERRY HICKS & ESTHER HICKS, ABRAHAM SPEAKS: A NEW
BEGINNING I, 18 (1996) ("That which is like unto itself is drawn.").
133. See FRITJOF CAPRA, THE TAO OF PHYSICS 28-9 (1975) ("Because one

representation of reality is so much easier to grasp than reality itself, we tend
to confuse the two and to take our concepts and symbols for reality.").
134. See id. According to the text,
It is of great value for you to understand the Law of Attraction, for it is
not your friend, or your enemy, it just is. It will attract more of
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proposition,'35 this phenomenon by which we link or correlate
apparently external reality with distinctly internal thought is
called "non-local phase-lock over space-like intervals."'36 For some,
this principle of creation is called the "Law of Attraction." 1"7 Carl
Jung called this phenomenon "synchronicity. "'' In any event, how
are blacks, who fear that they will be maltreated, and whites, who
expect blacks to act uncivilized and rudely, creating experiences in
which they import these fears and expectations? Can we ask
whether blacks and whites, at the very least, believe a priori that
an experience will occur and, in so doing, create (or see) it? ...If I
have asked a proper theoretically testable question, then it would
appear that ethnography can assist us in understanding how
structural oppression like white supremacy and day-to-day
experiences like racially discriminatory practices conjoin naturally
with a racialized consciousness? By addressing this question
seriously, we might learn that structural oppression depends on
manifold forces in order for it to have any significant meaning in
our lives. In the end, we might conclude, however disconcertedly,
that white supremacy and black inferiority, that white racism and
black victimization,
require an intimate, interdependent

whatever you are thinking to you. As you are thinking in the direction
of that which is wanted, or that which you may term a positive thoughtthe Law of Attraction will bring to you more thoughts that are in
harmony with that. And as you are considering or pondering that which
you do not want-the Law of Attraction will, in the same way, bring to
you other negative thoughts that will enhance the original thought.
Id. at 17-18.
135. CARL G. JUNG, ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY: ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE
36 (1968) (citing Carl G. Jung, Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting
Principle,in COLLECTED WORKS OF CARL G. JUNG).
136. GARY ZUKAV, THE DANCING Wu LI MASTERS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
NEW PHYSICS 298 n.t (1979)
When separate parts at one level of reality interact with each other by
the exchange of signals, i.e., forces, they (their separate wave functions)
become correlated at the next higher level of reality. In this way, they
are no longer really 'separate part,' appearances on the lower level to the
contrary.
137. See Hicks & Hicks, supra note 132. According to the text:
Once one of your beliefs has surfaced, that belief, or thought - for a belief
is nothing more than a thought that you have thought before, that you
continue to think - that thought will attract other thoughts that are like
it. It is what we call the 'Law of Attraction.'
Id. at 17 (italics in the original text).
138. See ROBERT H. HOPCKE, THERE ARE NO ACCIDENTS: SYNCHRONICITY
AND

THE STORIES OF OUR LIVES 26 (1997) (synchronicity

means "the

simultaneous occurrence of two meaningful but not causally connected
events.").
139. See ORNSTEIN, supra note 74. at 18 ("Once a friend unwittingly
emphasized this [process of limiting our ordinary consciousness] to me by
saying: 'I'll see it when I believe it'.").
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relationship between at the very least blacks and whites. 4"
Given that minorities do succeed in a nation rife with racial
prejudice, it must follow that structural oppression, albeit
injurious, cannot explain the day-to-day choices that blacks and
other minorities make.
It equally cannot guarantee whites
economic success. After all, white citizens occupy lower socioeconomic status too. By looking to ethnographies, legal scholars
can learn the manner in which structural oppression and race
discrimination work in our daily lives, but a structural analysis
alone simply encourages us to continue the cause-effect thinking of
racial oppression. Whether we rely on ethnographies or other
social science data, what do we get, especially race scholars, by
holding on to the notion that structural oppression (cause)
victimizes blacks (effect)? How does this cause-effect logic of
structural oppression enable legal scholars, especially Race Crits,
to think beyond the current paradigm that white racism singularly
oppresses and violates blacks and other minorities? According to
Robert H. Hopcke,
[Clausal thinking seduces us into an illusion of complete power over
our surroundings and enhances our sense that we are in control of
our destiny, a vision quite flattering to our own egos. Cause-andeffect thinking enables us to feel in control, to split ourselves off
from the world "outside" and operate upon it. In this causal
worldview, we are limited only by the consequences of our actions,
but if we accept
the consequences of our actions, then act we may,
41
and freely.1
As Hopcke more than suggest, the cause-effect dichotomy
does not actually exist. Yet, let us hypothesize for this analysis
that it does. Why then, we must ask, in the case of structural
oppression, does cause-effect thinking empower whites? Why not
for blacks too? This cause-effect thinking suggests that whites
have a greater ability to determine their life's fortunes by
organizing a society that damages the life chances of others. How
are blacks or other minorities served by cause-effect thinking? Are
they flattering or failing their egos? Hopcke makes a perhaps
indisputable point when he argues that cause-effect thinking
allows people, especially in the West, to split themselves off from
the world and to operate on it. In the context of structural
oppression, do blacks wish to state that their reality remains at an
arms-length distance from us, and to this extent blacks have no
control over it."' If they adhere to this Neo-Cartesian proposition,
140. Cf. CAPRA, supra note 133, at 141 ("In atomic physics,

then, the

scientist cannot play the role of a detached objective observer, but becomes
involved in the world he observes to the extent that he influences the
properties of the observed objects.").

141. Id. at 27.
142. See CAPRA, supranote 133, at 141. Capra writes that:
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blacks must also assert that they cannot change a structurally
oppressive environment because social reality acts upon them.
Thus reality exists objectively, externally. Yet, if the world
depends on cause-effect logic, why not act with the force to alter
how race functions in our society? Why not act without regard to
race, so that it has no force in a given individual's life?...
Given Hopcke's argument and Austin's project, it would be
difficult to use ethnographies effectively, especially in light of her
hypothetical discussion," ifwe simply assert that the fast food
industry engages in policies that shield structural oppression from
legal redress by the manner in which this industry hires workers,
promotes workers, and deals with black consumers. Fortunately,
many race scholars like Kimberl Crenshaw have already taken
up this theoretical proposition. "'
By taking this ethnographic
approach, legal race scholars will certainly learn a great deal from
Austin's article.
However, she did not equip us to use
ethnographic data to ask critical, testable questions that take us
beyond simple constructs: white racism oppresses blacks and other
minorities.
Structural
oppression violates
historically
marginalized citizens like blacks.
Without this equipment, I must wonder how much more will
race scholars learn. As such, research questions that arise within
this construct may reveal subtle ways in which structural
oppression might work. Many race scholars already live within
this construct, and perhaps as a consequence we cannot effectively
get beyond it. " 6 We have become quite adept at asking questions
that have not yet convincingly breached its outer shell. Although
race scholars have researched within this construct, will they get
beyond the cause-effect logic of structural oppression? Do they

Mystical knowledge can never be obtained just by observation, but only
by full participation with one's whole being.
The nation of the
participator is thus crucial to the Eastern world view, and the Eastern
[mystics] have pushed this nation to the extreme, to a point where

observer and observed, subject and object, are not only inseparable but
also become indistinguishable.

Id.
143. Cf. TALBOT, supra note 46, at 3 ("[A]s Princeton physicist John A.
Wheeler suggests, we must replace the term 'observer' with the term
'participator.' We cannot observe the physical world, for as the new physics
tell us, there is no one physical world. We participate within a spectrum of all

possible realities.") (citation omitted) (italics in original text).
144. See Austin, supra note 4, at 238-39.
145. See Kimberld W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988).
146.

ORNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 39-40 ("Our 'agreement' on reality is

subject to common shared limitations that evolved to ensure the biological
survival of the race. All humans may agree on certain events only because we
are all similarly limited in our very structure as well as limited in our
culture.").
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wish to take this courageous step? Are race scholars simply
interested in finding very complex, but reliable, tools on which
they can base their claims that white racism explains black
oppression and causes the day-to-day life choices of historically
oppressed minorities? Or will we bravely ask how do poor, lowstatus workers like wage-earning blacks contribute to their
racialized experiences by holding onto beliefs even if they produce
ill effects? 47 I think not!
CONCLUSION

In Contextual Analysis, Austin pursues several goals in
relying on ethnographic studies: to glean an understanding of
racial discrimination that black workers and customer face in fast
food restaurants; to examine legal actions brought by these blacks,
by use of ethnographies to deconstruct legal decisions, and show
how cases problematize ethnographies; to conjoin legal decisions
and ethnographies as a way to provide thick, legal contextual
analysis of how blacks get constructed as "bad for business"; and to
explore how ethnographies and legal decisions serve as gateways
for exploring the impact of racial stereotypes in economic
transactions. 48
Regardless of whether Austin specifically
addresses the issues that I raised in this reply, she writes within a
progressive
jurisprudential
tradition
that
consistently
deconstructs text, so that we can better appreciate the meta- and
subtext of legal rulings. As a result, Austin's article should
broaden our thinking and analysis not only of legal decisions but
also institutional practices within the fast food industry. And to
the extent that we can draw inferences from her work, we can then
look at other institutional practices. In this way, Austin's work
invites us to study ethnographic works so that we can perhaps
better understand legal decisions, and so that we can pursue
rigorously "law and" scholarship in meaningful ways.
Yet, did Austin draw a very clear nexus between ethnographic
data and how courts can effectively use these data on which to rely
to grant credence to black perspectives, ones perhaps driven by
their special ability to detect racially discriminatory behavior?'49
Sadly, she did not. Keep in mind that, in reaching this conclusion,
I do not embrace what would be Daniel Farber and Suzanna

147. See BOHM, supra note 79, at 10-11 (Bohm means that: "thought doesn't
know it is doing something and then it struggles against what it is doing. It

doesn't want to know that it is doing it. And it struggles against the results,
trying to avoid those unpleasant results while keeping on with that way of
thinking. That is what I call sustained incoherence.).

148. Austin, supra note 4, at 209-11.
149. Id. at 238-39 ("Yet many blacks believe that they can detect racially
discriminatory behavior when they experience it, though convincing a court or
jury of this is quite difficult.").
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Sherry's position: Austin argues for legal recognition of a minority
person's positionality, one that turns not on legal fact but on
personal subjectivity." ° Rather, I ask this question and reach this
conclusion because given her project, Austin should have taken up
this task much more explicitly as she sought to guide both the
general reader, the race scholar, and the courts toward the
justifiable and legally relevant use of ethnographic data. After all,
Austin argues that a fast food restaurant's doubtful "conduct
should be viewed in the context of the competitive or economic
position of the particular restaurant, the entire chain, or the
industry in general in order to determine if racism of an
institutional nature was operating.""' If structural oppression
leaves discernible, direct or circumstantial footprints, 52 Austin
could have better served courts and legal scholars by using
and
ethnographies to guide us critically, analytically,
methodologically toward an evidentiary admissible nexus so that
we can causatively or correlatively link these footprints to illegal
behavior or to discriminatory impact.
Equally important, Austin did not move us beyond the causeeffect logic of structural oppression, although it was perhaps her
goal to expose the manner in which such oppression operates
invisibly before courts. As Austin points out, fast food restaurants
directly defeat a black customer's claim of racism, and they
advance arguments that render such claims debatable."' Does the
claim prove the underlying substantive violation? No. Who then
should the courts believe? Do blacks have a special sense for
knowing when they have suffered not bad service but
discriminatory practices? If past experiences condition people to
then blacks
view a world through categories that limit awareness,
4
misinterpret.
and
misunderstand,
overreact,
may
Accordingly, I take the position that blacks may experience
racism because they expected it."' My position does not negate
150. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 52; Robinson, supra note 51 (critiquing
Farber and Sherry's methodological attack on Critical Race Theory).
151. Austin, supra note 4, at 235-36.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 228.
154. ORNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 52. Based on the Jerome Bruner, Roger
Sperry, and Leon Festinger proposition that awareness depends solely on
output regardless of input, Ornstein writes:
[Ihf you are "ready" to see a black ace of spades or a red ace of hearts

when a red ace of spades is shown, you will see one of the two choices
you have set for yourself. Or, if you are "ready" to make a straight eye

movement in response to a curved line, you will see the curved line as a
straight line.

Id
155. See id. at 54 ("Our thoughts are transitory, fleeting, moving from one
idea, object, image to another; yet it is always the same consciousness that
flows from experience to experience. More than any other factor, thoughts are

The John MarshallLaw Review

[34:245

racism. It also does not justify racism or discriminatory practice.'56
Nevertheless, institutional racism within an industry should not
create the idea that a fast food restaurant's bad service must
perforce be racially motivated. To do so, would be to embrace an
ecological fallacy. 57'
Austin acknowledges this point when she
argues that discriminatory practices get expressed with subtlety."8
If we grant that such racism arrives quietly and injures subtly,
then we should also ask whether blacks contribute to their
experiences by expecting whites to act discriminatorily. We do
comfortably assert that whites categorize blacks as aggressive and
as hostile actors." 9 If whites can operate on expectations, however
unconscious, can blacks suffer from the same disability? Given
her writings within a progressive jurisprudential tradition,
Austin's work would have violated traditional race scholarship if
she had demanded that race scholars take up this critical inquiry.
In so doing, she would have explored a naggingly stubborn
paradigm in grand Galilean fashion.

the foundation of normal consciousness.")

See also BOHM, THOUGHT AS
SYSTEM, supra note 20, at 8 (By thought, Bohm, refers to how we think, and
how such thinking becomes recorded in our brains. Thought influences our
perception, even though we cannot detect its present impact. "Thought is
active.")
156. Robinson, supra note 6, at 182. On this point, I have argued that:
At present, blacks place responsibility for their day-to-day experiences
on whites and racial oppression.
What if the source of how they
experience whites and America's policies rests with their expert
knowledge of race and its consciousness? This question does not absolve
white Americans of their willful ignorance of how their choices and
policies affect minorities, women, and the poor. How long will blacks
wait for whites to take personal responsibility for their [choices].. .before
they place their under erasure?
How long will blacks force their
children to experience the limits of a racialized expert knowledge, thus
requiring them to revive the impotence of their parents?
Id.
157. BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY, supra note 70, at 174 (The
ecological fallacy "occurs if differences observed among aggregates such as
communities are used to infer that comparable differences exist among
individuals.").
158. Austin, supra note 4, at 235-36.
159. ORNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 47. According to Jerome Bruner:
We develop stereotyped systems, or categories, for sorting input. The set
of categories we developed is limited, much more limited than the
input.... In social situations, the categories may be personality traits. If
we categorize a person as "aggressive," we then consistently tend to sort
all his actions in terms of this category.

